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Abstract:
Since it began almost 200 years ago, the Australia-Japan relationship has proved resilient, 
weathering storms and strains to develop into a strong, mature and mutually beneficial 
partnership founded on and supported by trade, girded by shared values and strengthened by 
security cooperation. The relationship continues to evolve, with recent years seeing renewed 
enthusiasm for even closer bilateral relations as well as enhanced trilateral cooperation with 
mutual ally the United States. Drivers of this change ranging from domestic political changes 
through to geopolitical challenges, most prominently the rise of China, are likely to persist in 
the short to medium term and promote even closer cooperation between Japan and Australia, 
as well a heightened sense of self-reliance in each country that will push them to take 
increasing responsibility for their own future rather than rely on the United States. This in 
turn will provide an opportunity for the two countries to play a greater role in shaping and 
safeguarding their own futures as well as that of their Asian neighbourhood.
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The modern Australia-Japan relationship is one between two robust democracies with 
advanced and sophisticated economies, underlain by a shared fundamental commitment to a 
stable and prosperous region. It is characterised by friendship across diverse and broad-
ranging sectors, from culture through trade to security. 
Having gone through many ups and downs over the more than 180 years since the first 
recorded contact between the two nations, most significant of which was when the two 
countries were on opposite sides during a bitter World War II campaign, Australia and Japan 
quickly put past animosities aside to forge a long-standing, mutually beneficial partnership 
anchored by trade and underscored by grass roots person-to-person ties that has since spread 
into other areas, most recently and importantly security. 
The current trajectory of bilateral relations is towards increasing closeness in relation to 
the two key pillars of the partnership, trade and security. This course is being driven by 
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policy responding to the changing regional geopolitical landscape, especially vis-à-vis China, 
as well as the domestic political and economic situation in mutual ally the United States. It is 
likely that this trend will continue under the present conservative governments in power in 
Japan and Australia ; however, liberal administrations, while unlikely to change the 
fundamental policy direction of the conservatives, could have a dampening effect on the 
momentum of current policy. Assuming the maintenance of each country’s security 
relationship with mutual ally the United States, this also means the Australia-Japan bilateral 
relationship has the potential to become increasingly significant to preserving security in the 
Asian region, particularly in North and Southeast Asia.
Establishment and development of the relationship
First contact
Australia-Japan ties sprung firstly from trade, when in 1831 an Australian whaling ship 
sought refuge in Hokkaido after sustaining storm damage, and later in the 19th century 
through culture, the first Japanese encountered by Australians’ being traveling performers, 
some of whom subsequently married Australians and settled in the country (Meaney, 1999). 
In 1883, the first Japanese migrants left for Australia to work as pearl divers but relations 
soured when more and more Japanese migrated to Australia to work in both the pearling and 
sugar cane industr ies , lead ing to the adopt ion of the ‘White Austra l ia’ pol icy in 
1901(Nakamura, 2006), and then later reached their lowest point with the advent of World 
War II.
Trade
Australia was the first nation to opens its doors to trade with Japan after World War II 
(Australian Broadcasting Corporation, 2007), the two countries signing the Australia-Japan 
Agreement on Commerce on 6 July 1957. This landmark agreement facilitated Japan 
becoming a key trade partner for Australia. Japan became Australia’s largest export market 
in the late 1960s (and remained so for more than forty years after; McClean, 2008) and was 
its second largest source of imports by the early 1970s (Drysdale and Yamazawa, 1993). 
Japan also was, and continues to be, an important source of foreign direct investment and 
tourism revenue for Australia. 
The two countries were active in promoting the establishment of regional trade 
architecture, cooperating to lay the foundations for the Pacific Economic Cooperation council 
in the early 1980s and then the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation in 1989 (Drysdale and 
Yamazawa, 1993).
Despite these strong trade ties, however, thorns remained in the economic relationship. 
Negotiations towards a bilateral free trade agreement (officially termed an economic 
partnership agreement) progressed painfully slowly, stymied by the protectionist demands of 
domestic lobby groups. 
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Security
In the decades following the war, the Australia-Japan relationship focused almost entirely 
on economics (Miller, 2012). Memories of the brutal treatment of Australian soldiers by the 
Imperial Japanese Army still resonated strongly in the collective Australian consciousness; 
lingering suspicions as to whether Japan had truly repented of its wartime crimes prevented 
closer cooperation between the two countries on security. 
However, with the passing of time, memories of World War II receded into history and 
this, as well as the mutual ally relationship with the United States, paved the way for the 
establishment of closer relations in the security field. The 2006 Australia-Japan Year of 
Exchange coincided with a significant stepping up of the security side of the bilateral 
relationship. 
The long-standing (1996-2007) Liberal-National coalition government under Prime 
Minister John Howard prioritised stronger relations with Australia’s major ally, the United 
States, and a key achievement of his government was even closer links with the world’s 
number one economy (Dobell, 2013).
The Howard government also made a number of important policies achievements in 
relation to Japan. While he did not start security cooperation with Japan, Howard gave it 
sufficient priority, promotion and momentum to enable Japan to become Australia’s fourth 
most important security partner after the United States, the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand (Dobell, 2013). 
The first Joint Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultations (2+2), announced by then-
Australian Foreign Minister Downer and held on 6 June 2007, followed the signing of a 
Comprehensive Strategic Partnership during the 2006 Australia-Japan Year of Exchange and 
the subsequent signing by Prime Ministers Howard and Abe of the Joint Declaration on 
Security Cooperation in March 2007, the 50th anniversary of the signing of the Commerce 
Agreement (Downer, 2007).  It is worth noting that at the time the Security Declaration was 
signed, then-Australian Opposition leader Kevin Rudd went on record to say that “there 
should be no step beyond the Declarat ion to a fu l l defence pact with Japan….may 
unnecessarily tie our [Australia’s] security interests to the vicissitudes of an unknown 
security policy future in north East Asia” (Dobell, 2013).
The ministerial consultations were a significant achievement, representing “the first time 
Australia had formalised with another country official meetings that encompassed both 
ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defence” and also the only such mechanism Japan had 
entered into with a country besides the United States (Miller, 2012). 
The formalisation of Australia’s security relationship with Japan effectively closed the 
loop between the US-Japan and US-Australia security alliances, making the alliance trilateral. 
At the time, Howard “said that the agreement meant that Japan would have a closer security 
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relationship with Australia than with any other country except the United States” (Dobell, 
2013). The first Trilateral Strategic Dialogue at Ministerial level between the “three great 
Pacific democracies’ (as Howard described them in 2005) was held in 2006 (Dobell, 2013).
Howard’s values, sentiments and priorities accorded perfectly with his Japanese 
counterpart at that time, then-Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, a noted conservative and 
nationalist. Abe continued the ‘quiet revolution’ in Japanese foreign policy that had been 
progressing under his predecessor, Jun’ichiro Koizumi, who had hand-picked Abe to succeed 
him, and was much admired by Howard (Dobell, 2013).
A closer partnership – recent changes in the relationship 
Closer partnership between the Australia and Japan has been foreshadowed by a 
analysts and commentators for some time. Way back in 1993, Kazuo Ogura, as Director-
General of the Economic Affairs Bureau in the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, asked if 
there was any reason why the two countries couldn't forge a “greater partnership”, noting 
among other things, their similar trade ethos supporting the market economy and free trade, 
and the high interdependence of the two countries’ economies (Ogura, 25 October 1993).
However, following a change of government in Australia in December 2007 to Labor 
after almost eight years under the pro-US alliance Howard Liberal-National coalition, 
engagement with Japan became overshadowed through a shift in Australian priorities to 
focus on emerging economies such as South Korea and China (Miller, 2012). While Labor, 
firstly under the Prime Ministership of Mandarin-speaking former diplomat Kevin Rudd and 
then Julia Gillard, the country’s first female head of government, did not unravel the Howard 
government’s achievements vis-à-vis trade and security relations with Japan, neither did it 
maintain the previous government’s momentum (Dobell, 2013). There was a discernible shift 
in direction and emphasis under Labor towards strengthening relations with China. 
Since the return to power in both countries of conservative governments (the LDP, under 
Shinzo Abe, in his second stint as Prime Minister, retook the reins of government in Japan in 
December 2012, while the Liberal-National coalition led by Tony Abbott, defeated the Julia 
Gillard-led Labor coalition in Australia’s September 2013 General Election), there has been a 
renewed emphasis on the importance of the Australia-Japan relationship, particularly within a 
regional security context, in a similar vein to that of the previous Howard-Abe governments.  
Trade- reaching of a long-held goal
After years of effort, the first round of negotiations towards concluding an Economic 
Partnership Agreement (EPA) between Australia and Japan kicked off on 24 April 2007 
under the conservative Howard and Abe governments. Following 16 rounds, the conclusion of 
negotiations was announced 7 April 2014 during Tony Abbott’s inaugural prime ministerial 
visit to Japan, with the Economic Partnership Agreement being signed on 8 July 2014 by 
Prime Ministers Abbott and Abe during the latter’s prime ministerial visit to Australia. 
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The deal is Japan’s first free trade agreement with a major agricultural exporter (Terada, 
2014). Under it, Japan promises to make a set of unprecedented concessions to Australia vis-a-
vis liberalisation of Japanese agriculture in exchange for Australia dropping auto and home 
electronics tariffs (Doonan, 2014; Terada, 2014) The EPA fuelled hopes that it would lead to a 
breakthrough in Japan-US Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) negotiations that had reached a 
deadlock over autos and agriculture (Donnan, 2014), a hope yet to be realised. 
A more active security partnership
Security has become such an important part of the Australia-Japan relationship that 
some commentators have argued that ties between the two countries are “key to regional 
stability” (Miller, 2012). Australian Prime Minister Tony Abbott has referred to the 
partnership with Japan as one “for peace, for prosperity and for the rule of law” (Hurst, 2014). 
Significant steps forward in the bilateral security partnership over the last seven years 
include the establishment of regular Joint Foreign and Defence Ministers (2+2) Consultations, 
and the signing of the Agreement Concerning the transfer of Defence Equipment and 
Technology in mid 2014 (Hurst, 2014). 
An Australian Prime Minister for the first time took part in a meeting of Japan’s 
National Security Council when Prime Minister Tony Abbott attended an NSC meeting 
during his April 2014 official visit to Japan (Scott, 2014). During Prime Minister Abe’s visit to 
Australia in July 2014, he and Prime Minister Abbott tasked officials to develop a strategy to 
strengthen cooperation in the Pacific region (Office of the Prime Minister of Australia, 2014). 
Other cooperative initiatives are already in the pipeline; during Prime Minister Abe’s 
Australian visit, he and Prime Minister Abbott decided to commence negotiations on an 
defence cooperation agreement to reciprocally improve administrative, policy and legal 
procedures to facilitate joint operations and exercises (Office of the Prime Minister of 
Australia, 2014).
New regional order – drivers of relationship change
Impact of conservative governments
In Australia: The almost simultaneous return to power of conservative governments in 
Australia and Japan has certainly been one of the key drivers of change in the bilateral 
relationship. 
In terms of trade, it was no coincidence that the 2013 change of government saw 
negotiations towards an Australia-Japan free trade deal, at a near-deadlock after six years 
under a Labor government that continued to provide assistance to the Australian auto 
industry and maintained tariffs on imported vehicles, move forward once again (Terada, 2014). 
The Abbott government’s indication that it would cut tariffs on vehicles imported into 
Australia, Japan’s second largest auto market, proved pivotal to conclusion of an EPA, as 
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elimination of auto tariffs was a key Japanese demand (Terada, 2014).
Inheritor of the Howard-era values-driven approach, the current Liberal-National coalition 
government has gone to some lengths to emphasise the importance of Australia-Japan ties 
and the common bonds shared by the two countries. Abbott has said: “Japan’s economic 
resurgence under Prime Minister Abe will be good for Japan, good for Australia and good for 
the world” (Abbott, 2014). Australian Defence Minister David Johnston said that Australia 
sought proactive defence cooperation with Japan and the United States based on “common 
democratic values” (McPhedran, 2014). 
Abbott has gone so far as to describe Japan as an “exemplary international citizen” and 
reiterate his support for Japan reinterpreting its constitution (Hurst, 2014) to allow the 
exercising of the right to collective defence. Abbott’s public comments in support of Japan, as 
well as open criticism of China, prompted one commentator to declare: “Australia….has quite 
dramatically and unexpectedly taken sides” (Sainsbury, 2014).
Prime Minister Abe during his July 2014 official visit to Australia became the first 
Japanese Prime Minister to address the Australian Parliament (Hurst, 2014). Following his 
address, he received a standing ovation (Lee, 2014).
Expanding only slightly on his Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade-supplied briefing 
(which described the bilateral partnership as Australia’s “closest and most mature in the 
region” and “fundamentally important to both countries’ strategic and economic interests” 
(Dobell, 2013)), Abbott, publicly referred to Japan as ‘Australia’s best friend in Asia’ only a 
month after taking office as Prime Minister (Scott, 2014).
In Japan: Prime Minister Abe, since his first administration back in 2006-7, has placed 
priority on forging closer ties with Australia and pushed strongly for the conclusion of an 
EPA as well as greater bilateral defence cooperation (Takeda, 2014). 
Under the conservative Abe, Japan is making the transition to a more active military 
role, both in relation to its alliance relationships with Australia and the United States, and 
globally. As part of his goal to see Japan become a ‘normal’ nation vis-à-vis the military, Abe 
has taken a number of steps to end long-standing bans that had acted to restrict Japanese 
defence activities and initiatives. On 1 July 2014, the Abe Cabinet decided to end Japan’s 
longstanding ban on exercising the right to collective defence (Hurst, 2014). 
The realisation of a dream long-held by Abe, this achievement was preceded by a flurry 
of new initiatives introduced soon after Abe took power, including the establishment of a 
National Security Council, formulation of Japan’s first-ever National Security Strategy, which 
articulates Japan’s vision for being a “Proactive Contributor to Peace”, the adoption of new 
National Defense Program Guidelines that are seeing a long-called for increase in defence 
spending, and the relaxing of long-standing bans on arms exports (Ministry of Foreign 
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Affairs, 2014). While relations with Australia didn’t drive the introduction of these initiatives, 
they will benefit significantly from the changed defence framework that Japan is now able to 
operate within. 
Relationship with the US
Australia’s and Japan’s respective relationships with the United States and the desire of 
both countries to strengthen their partnerships with their senior alliance partner has been a 
driver for a number of recent policy initiatives in each country. For Australia, one policy 
decision that falls into this category is the decision to station 3000 more US troops at its 
marine base in Darwin in Central Northern Australia. In late 2013, very early on in its 
current term, the Abbott government, in a move aimed at strengthening Australia’s alliance 
with the United States, directed a multibillion-dollar arms upgrade that saw Australia become 
the 7th largest arms buyer globally (Taylor, 2014).
For Japan, too, there is a strong desire to strengthen relations with the United States, 
particularly strategic cooperation. The Japanese government continues to work hard to reach 
workable solutions on the issue of US bases in Japan, including the nature of cost-sharing 
arrangements, while at the same time managing the concerns of residents near bases. Japan 
is also much more receptive to US overtures to become a more ‘normal’ nation in terms of its 
defence, realising the limitations on the ability of the United States to guarantee Japan’s, and 
the region’s, security. This will require Japan to assume greater responsibility for its own 
defence as well as the defence of its allies.
Regional issues including China
Clearly, China’s growing political, economic and military power is a driver of change in 
the Australia-Japan relationship.
China surpassed Japan to become Australia’s number one trading partner in 2007 (Lee, 
2014). Australia’s trade with China has tripled over the last seven years to be currently worth 
AUD141 billion (USD133 billion) (Taylor, 2014) and the country takes three-quarters of 
Australia’s iron ore exports (Scott, 2014). China now accounts for 36 percent of Australian 
exports (Taylor, 2014) and 27 percent of Australia’s two-way merchandised goods trade as 
opposed to Japan, which accounts for only 13 percent of two-way trade with Australia; 25 
years ago the position of the two countries was largely reversed (Scott , 2014). As a 
consequence of China’s growing trade weight, Japan has had to take a more aggressive 
approach in both securing the commodities it needs for itself and its industry and to selling its 
products to Australia. For its part, Australia must walk a finely balanced line between its 
new primary trading partner and its former number one trading partner of good faith and 
long standing.
China is also a key factor in security calculations not only between Australia and Japan 
and within the trilateral alliance with the United States but also for other countries in the 
Asian region. Australian Communications Minister Malcolm Turnbull has described Chinese 
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actions in support of its territorial claims in the South China Sea as “singularly unhelpful” and 
said the consequence was China’s neighbors “drawing closer to the United States than ever 
before” (Taylor, 2014).
For Japan’s part, it sees China’s growing power as a threat to itself. Japan has growing 
doubts about whether and/or how long US deterrence will remain effective in restraining 
Chinese aggression in the region. Concerns regarding US long-term commitment to the Asian 
region, whether because of political will, economic constraints or distractions in other regions 
(Goh, 2014) mean that Japan is unable to rely on its ally to protect it as it once could and so is 
now looking to enhance its self defence capabilities and to get others to help (White, 2014).
Future directions for the Australia-Japan partnership
Whether the current direction and momentum of the Australia-Japan relationship 
continues depends on a number of factors. These include the likelihood of a change in 
government in either country as well as changes in the domestic political and economic 
environment in mutual ally the United States.
Political and economic environment in Australia 
A continuation of Liberal-National Coalition government in Australia would be expected 
to see current policy emphasising trilateral security cooperation between Australia, Japan and 
the United States move forward as a foreign policy priority. Japan would also continue to 
enjoy a more highly prioritised status among Australia’s trade partners based not only on its 
track record as a reliable trading partner and the relative long-standing and maturity of the 
bilateral relationship but also on the conservative government’s positive assessment of Japan 
as a country sharing Australia’s democratic free market values.
On the other hand, a Labor government could see a return to downplaying the Australia-
Japan bilateral relationship in favour of currying favour with Australia’s current number one 
two-way trade partner, China (DFAT, 2013). In his speech to the Lowy Institute on 27 August 
2013, only 11 days before a federal election that would see his Labor government thrown out 
of office, then Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd telegraphed such a likelihood in a 
foreign policy speech that mentions China no fewer than 22 times, more than Australian allies 
the United States (three mentions) and Japan (four mentions) put together (Rudd, 2013). 
Though he flags China as one of Australia’s five key relationships in Asia, it is notable that 
Rudd’s speech does not touch at all upon security matters in reference to China (Rudd, 2013).
With regard to trade, Australia’s economy relies heavily on its natural energy and 
mineral resources, which are characterised by high-value, long-term contracts. This is 
especially true for commodities such as LNG. Australia currently accounts for 61 percent of 
Japan’s iron ore imports and three quarters of Western Australia’s LNG exports go to Japan 
(Goh, 2014). Changes in Japan’s energy mix as a result of the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear 
accident and the subsequent shuttering of Japan’s nuclear power generation capacity will see 
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Japan needing to continue to import most of its energy requirements and thus it will remain 
an important trading partner for Australia, whichever stripe of government happens to be in 
power.
Political and economic environment in Japan
In his historic address to the Australian Parliament on 8 July 2014, Japanese Prime 
Minister Shinzo Abe gave a clear indication of the direction of the bilateral relationship under 
continued LDP stewardship. Placing Australia alongside mutual ally the United States at the 
forefront of Japan’s future defence strategy, Abe told the parliament that their two countries 
would be “joining hands with the United States, an ally for both our nations” and highlighted 
Japan’s aspirations to be a country that would work to build an international order upholding 
the rules of law and so make regional seas and skies “open and free” (McPhedran, 2014). Abe 
described the new agreement with Australia on defence technology as the first part of 
“engraving the special relationship in our future” (McPhedran, 2014). Australian strategic 
analyst Hugh White said that Abe’s speech clearly marked Australia as one of the central 
planks of Japan’s security plan for the Asia-Pacific (McPhedran, 2014).
Despite a two-decade long stagnation during the 1990s and 2000s, Japan is still the 
world’s third-largest economy and “will remain Asia’s most capable and advanced economy for 
decades” (Lee, 2014). Japanese firms have a large and important role (more so than Chinese 
counterparts) supplying capital and exporting innovation to neighbouring economies (Lee, 
2014). Thus Japan is likely to remain an important regional economic player at the very least 
in the short to medium term. Given this, and its large middle class and domestic consumption 
market (Lee, 2014), Japan will thus continue to be a key trading partner for Australia, based 
on the complementarities of their economies for the foreseeable future.
Domestic US politics and changes in the domestic environment in the United States
As the junior partners in the trilateral alliance, both Australia and Japan can be subject 
to issues in the US domestic political environment that are not directly related to the 
bilateral/trilateral relationships but because of the sector concerned, have a spill over effect. 
The imperative on the US government to defer in the first instance to domestic interests, 
including powerful lobby groups, and the needs of the US polity means that responding to 
these interests may require making requests of its allies that, because of their weaker 
position within the alliance, they are not able to readily dismiss, even if meeting such requests 
goes against their own interests. 
In trade, for example, demands by powerful domestic lobby groups in the United States 
to protect particular local industries places boundaries on the US government’s negotiation 
position such that it may be unable to offer concessions sought by other parties even while 
demanding such concessions itself. This kind of unequal bargaining power can lead to the 
type of stalemate we see currently with the TPP, where Japan, despite concluding an FTA 
with Australia that will see the latter’s beef exports become even more competitive against 
American rivals, failed to get the Obama administration to compromise on its demands that 
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Japan substantially reduce import tariffs on US beef (Terada, 2014)
In the area of security as well, the unequal power status of the trilateral alliance 
partners is likely to see a continuation of past practice in which the US demands, and gets, 
alliance partners to shoulder a greater proportion of the burden of maintaining a certain level 
of security and defence capability. This has been seen previously vis-à-vis the cost sharing 
arrangement for US bases on Japanese soil, as well as the recently-implemented increase in 
the number of US marines stationed in Darwin, Australia. 
The United States, to a significant extent, has been supportive of Prime Minister Abe’s 
efforts to bolster Japan’s defence force capabilities by increasing military spending, lifting the 
ban on arms exports and widening the contingencies in which Japan’s armed forces could be 
deployed (Soble, 2014) because this lessens the burden on the US for ensuring peace and 
stability in the region and globally. 
Without a significant improvement in present economic conditions in the United States 
there is likely to be continued domestic pressure to tighten US government spending, 
including on the military. This means that the US government is likely to continue pushing 
for its allies to take on increased responsibility in regional security projects, such as military 
modernisation in Southeast Asia, that in the past would have been US-led (Soble, 2014). In 
June 2014, for example, the deputy commander of the US Marines in the Pacific urged the 
Australian Government to consider undertaking a more assertive policy role in the South and 
East China seas by deploying more navy vessels, alongside Japanese and American vessels to 
the north (Taylor, 2014).
Conclusion
Australia-Japan relations, though fractured and fraught at times, have remained resilient 
over the last almost 200 years of their existence. Adjusting to internal and external change, 
some of which has been outside either’s control, the relationship has continued to move 
forward and mature, in no small part due to undergirding shared democratic values and a 
commitment to the free market and rule of law. 
Having played such a central role in the two countries’ early contact, trade has gone on 
to become a central pillar of the relationship, not just in a bilateral context but within broader, 
multilateral frameworks. Security, a much newer field of cooperation for the two allies, is 
proving a sector ripe for deeper, wider cooperation. Such cooperation, bilaterally and 
trilaterally with mutual ally the United States, has the potential to be a significant force for 
safeguarding regional stability and security, and for promoting and facilitating greater 
cooperation and confidence building between neighbouring countries in the Asian region.
The drivers of change in the Australia-Japan relationship, ranging from domestic politics 
through to the rise of China, are likely to see the relationship grow closer in the future, 
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regardless of the political persuasion of national governments. These changes are increasingly 
fostering an attitude where each country is prepared to take on more responsibility for its 
own future, particularly on security, realising that while the alliance with the United States 
remains an important safeguard, it can no longer be relied on without question as it had been 
in the past.
By shouldering more of the burden, however, Australia and Japan have the opportunity 
to have a greater say and play a more significant role in shaping and safeguarding their 
individual and collective future as well as that of the region more broadly. 
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